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Friday, October 10, 2003
2003 - 2004 Williams Project Scholars Speakers
Series and the UCLA School of Law Faculty Colloquium
Madhavi
Sunder
(UC
Davis School of Law, visiting Cornell)
"The New Enlightenment: Women, Gays, and the Quest
for Freedom Within Religion and Culture, Not Just
Without Them"
2:00-3:30 pm.
Tower Room, 4th Floor, Hugh and Hazel Darling Law
Library
Please join the Williams Project in welcoming in Professor
Madhavi Sunder as she presents her paper, The New Enlightenment: Women, Gays,
and the Quest for Freedom Within Religion and Culture, Not Just Without Them, as part of the 2003 - 2004 Williams Project Scholars Speakers Series
and the UCLA School of Law Faculty Colloquium.
* Click here for Professor Sunder's cover
memo regarding her talk (also available below).
*
Click here to download Professor Sunder's talk, which is comprised of two
parts:
- an edited version of her
Cultural
Dissent article (Microsoft Word, 456 KB), and
- the entire Piercing
the Veil article (Microsoft Word, 525 KB). To shorten the reading of
the latter, Prof. Sunder suggests that colloquium participants focus on the
Introduction and Parts I, III, and IV.B.
Currently a Visiting Professor at Cornell
Law School, Madhavi Sunder is
a Professor of Law at University of California, Davis
School of Law. She holds degrees from Harvard College (A.B.
1992, magna cum laude) and Stanford Law School
(J.D. 1997). Professor Sunder areas of expertise include
intellectual property, women's international human
rights, cultural studies, development and globalization.
Her publications include
*
Note, Authorship and
Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual
Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
49 STANFORD L. REV. 143 (1996);
* Intellectual Property and Identity
Politics: Playing With Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 69 (2000);
* Cultural Dissent, 54 STANFORD L. REV..
495 (2001), which was awarded Honorable Mention,
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Scholarly
Paper Prize 2002; and
* Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J.
1399 (2003).
For more information, please contact the Williams Project at (310) 267-4382 or
williamsinstitute@law.ucla.edu.
MEMO
To: UCLA Williams Project workshop participants
From: Madhavi Sunder Cornell Law School (Visiting
Professor) UC Davis School of Law (Professor) Date:
October 1, 2003
________________________________________________________________________
I hope to use this forum to help begin to develop a
trilogy of works (two published, one in-progress) into a
book titled The New Enlightenment. I have
attached an excerpt from the first part of the trilogy,
Cultural Dissent, published in the STANFORD LAW
REVIEW, and the entire middle part of the trilogy,
Piercing the Veil, recently published in the YALE
LAW JOURNAL. To shorten the read of the latter, feel
free to focus on the Introduction and Parts I, III, and
IV.B.
From gay bishops to Muslim women seeking equality
within Islam, individuals today seek rights within
culture and religion, not just without them. These
claims represent a sharp break from the
antidiscrimination strategy of the old Enlightenment,
which sought civil and human rights in the public
sphere, but accepted, and even expected, discrimination
in the private spheres of culture and religion. I
identify these claims as an effort to create a “New
Enlightenment,” one that extends old Enlightenment norms
into the private sphere. Increasingly, individuals find
the options of the old Enlightenment wanting. Those
options are premised on a thin theory of liberty
(because only leaders, and not members, have the right
to define and create culture), and a thin theory of
equality (because they ignore the cultural contexts that
remain important to individuals even in the modern day).
The New Enlightenment offers a blueprint for
confronting burgeoning cultural conflicts—from Iraq and
Afghanistan, to Nigeria, India, and Pakistan, to the
United States—between equality and modernity, on the one
hand, and religion and culture on the other. The New
Enlightenment confronts the New Sovereignty of religion
and culture, seeking law and rights within these
traditionally extralegal spaces. A number of
contemporary trends—globalization, modernization,
liberalization, postcolonialism, the Internet,
postmodernism, and individualism—fuel this engine of
change. But law, premised on old Enlightenment norms
that value diversity across groups but not within them,
more often serves the efforts of traditionalists to
stymie change than it serves the reform efforts of
cultural dissenters.
The New Enlightenment will tell this story
through revisions of my three law review articles, along
with a new Foreword and Afterword. Below I outline
briefly my three papers—each of them centrally devoted
to a case study—highlighting this phenomenon. I then
raise some of the questions that remain about those
papers, which will require further development in the
book.
A. The Trilogy
Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001),
identifies the rise of new claims to broaden the
traditional terms of cultural membership in response to
globalization, the Internet, and modernity. While
traditional, non-Western societies often spring to mind
when one hears the term “culture,” the paper offers the
gay Boy Scout controversy in the U.S. as an example of
cultural dissent—and what happens when law intervenes to
promote cultural survival, instead. The paper begins to
make a normative case for law’s promotion of dissent
within associations, not just across them as traditional
liberal theory advocates.
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399 (2003),
instantiates cultural dissent on a global scale with its
focus on women’s human rights activism in Muslim
communities. It characterizes such claims as part of a
“New Enlightenment,” in contrast to the
antidiscrimination claims of the old Enlightenment.
Perhaps most importantly, it considers legal strategies
for operationalizing the New Enlightenment.
My current work-in-progress, IP3,
ends the trilogy with a case study of indigenous
peoples’ claims for intellectual property in their
traditional knowledge and genetic resources. The Article
critically engages these claims as one result of the
convergence of identity politics, the Internet Protocol,
and intellectual property. This paper goes further than
the previous two in acknowledging the reality of unequal
cultural power in the world and the need for some legal
regulation of culture flows (through, for example,
intellectual property law). Unlike current intellectual
property scholarship, which takes an increasingly binary
approach of “intellectual property versus the public
domain” that would dismiss new indigenous claims for
intellectual property, I recognize these new claims as
efforts by individuals formerly the objects of property
to now be property subjects, with some control over
their cultures and the commercial value that derives
from cultural commodities. At the same time, the paper
cautions that such rights must not be deployed to secure
cultural isolationism and internal despotism. It seeks
to offer legal solutions that do not insulate cultures
from global discourse and the New Enlightenment.
B. What Is to Be Done?
Several issues remain ripe for further development of
the New Enlightenment idea. A first set of questions
centers on my underlying conception of cultural dissent.
Should law’s promotion of cultural dissent rest on an
autonomy theory (dissent for its own sake), a
democratic/marketplace theory (dissent to foster
diversity), or an antisubordination theory (which
may prefer some forms of dissent over others)? In
answering this question, I will need to apply my theory
to two cases: the illiberal dissenter and the
interloper. Should they, too, have standing to
assert legally cognizable dissent claims? Finally,
instead of freedom within culture and religion, why not
rely exclusively on freedom without—through secession
and reconstitution? That is, should the remedy for
cultural or religious despotism be limited to schism?
Why shouldn’t gay or pro-gay Scouts (or gay or pro-gay
Episcopalians) leave to form their own association?
A second set of questions focuses on how law should
operationalize the New Enlightenment. This is the
question of the kind and extent of legal intervention I
envision. Up until now, I have sought to highlight the
presence of cultural dissent and to describe how law, in
eliding it, also quashes it. I suggest that in
recognizing cultural dissent, legal decisionmakers
will find it difficult to continue to side with
fundamentalists, and may thereby open up cultures to
allow more liberty and equality inside them. Admittedly,
this approach is largely passive, envisioning the law
stepping in only when dissenters or traditionalists
affirmatively make claims before it. But why not go
further? Does not the New Enlightenment compel an
affirmative right to be free of discrimination carried
out in the name of religion and culture? Should law
offer women denied ordination as clerics in the Catholic
Church a cause of action?
I look forward to our discussion. |
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