Alexander Stremitzer
UCLA School of Law

“Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-in”

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW
LAW & ECONOMICS WORKSHOP
Thursday, September 24, 2015
12:05 pm – 1:40 PM
Law Room 1314

For UCLA workshop. Please do not cite or quote without permission.
Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-in

Rebecca Stone and Alexander Stremitzer†

UCLA

September 15, 2015

Abstract

In the absence of a legal regime enforcing promises, the classical prediction of contract theory is that promisees will underinvest in reliance whenever the promisor has a self-interested reason to break her promise down the road. But if a promisor experiences guilt for breaking her promise, this guilt may be intensified by the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Anticipating this, the promisee has a strategic reason to overinvest in reliance in order to psychologically lock the promisor in to keeping her promise. A legal regime that enforces promises may therefore have the unexpected benefit of reducing overreliance as promisees no longer have to rely on the extra-legal mechanism of psychological lock-in in order to induce a promisor to keep her promise. We obtain experimental evidence supporting the existence of this psychological lock-in effect.

Keywords: promises, reliance, remedies, contracts, crowding out.

JEL-Classification: K12, A13, C91, C72, D64.

*The authors are grateful to Kathy Zeiler, Oren Bar-Gill, Rob MacCoun, and Joseph Doherty. We are also grateful to seminar audiences at Boston University, Paris II, BDM Lab at UCLA Anderson, the 2015 EMLS Workshop at UCLA, and the ISNIE 2015 meeting. We thank Calvin Cam and Rita Hsu for excellent research assistance. Financial Support by a 2014-15 UCLA Faculty Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged.

†UCLA Law School, 385 Charles E. Young Drive, 1242 Law Building, Los Angeles, CA 90095. rebecca.stone@law.ucla.edu. stremitzer@law.ucla.edu.
1 Introduction

In the absence of legal enforcement, a promisee may be wary of relying on a promise for fear that the promisor won’t keep her promise. Since classical economic theory assumes that agents are rational and self-interested, it predicts that a promisee won’t be willing to invest in reliance on a promise, whenever the promisor may have a self-interested reason to break it. Legal enforcement of promises should therefore mitigate the problem of underinvestment by giving the promisor a self-interested reason to keep her promise, thus assuring the promisee that his investment on the promise won’t be wasted. Of course, if, contrary to the predictions of classical theory, many promisors are intrinsically motivated to keep their promises, this underinvestment problem will be mitigated even in the absence of a legal regime. But since many people behave opportunistically some of the time, departures from the self-interest assumption are unlikely to eliminate this problem of underinvestment entirely. A large literature on breach remedies and the holdup problem studies how the introduction of third-party enforcement can mitigate the underinvestment problem.\(^1\)

But reducing underinvestment might not be the only virtue of legal enforcement once we acknowledge that many people may be intrinsically motivated to keep their promises. For it is plausible to suppose that a promisor’s intrinsic motivation to keep her promises is enhanced when the promisee relies to his detriment on the promise. And, if that is the case, this gives the promisee an incentive to strategically rely on

the promise in order to make the promisor more likely to keep her promise. In other words, the promisee might overinvest rather than underinvest in the absence of a legal regime in order to psychologically lock in the promisor. And so, an unexpected benefit of legal enforcement might be to eliminate this motive to overinvest, since the legal regime provides assurance that the promise will be kept anyway, and the promisee no longer has to rely on the extralegal mechanism of psychological lock-in.

In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether promisees invest in order to psychologically lock in a promisor and whether legal enforcement of relied upon promises can therefore have the unexpected benefit of reducing overinvestment. We focus on three questions. First, does a promisee’s reliance on a promise make the promisor more likely to keep the promise? Second, do promisees anticipate such an effect, and so strategically rely on promises in order to make the promisor more likely to keep her promise. Third, what benefits for social welfare arise from legal enforcement of promises that have been relied upon? In particular, in what ways does such legal enforcement improve promisees’ investment decisions? Does it improve rates of promise keeping?

Casual observation, introspection, as well as plenty empirical evidence tells us that many people are motivated to keep their promises, even in the absence of self-interested reasons to do so (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Vanberg 2008, Charness and Dufwenberg 2010). We conjecture that many people are even more inclined to keep their promises when they have been relied upon, even when this reliance does not confer any material benefit on them.

---

2For notable contributions to the broader literature in political science and social psychology, see Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), Sally (1995), and Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007)
Reliance typically harms the promisee when a promise is broken, and if promisors feel more guilty when they break promises that cause more harm to the promisee, then reliance may make promisors more inclined to keep them. Promisees, in turn, may anticipate this, and so they may rely on a promise, even when such reliance is otherwise unproductive, in order to make the promisor more motivated to keep it. Thus, legal enforcement of relied-upon promises may have the unexpected benefit of reducing a promisee’s felt need to invest in reliance on a promise when such reliance is unproductive. In other words, legal enforcement may have the unexpected benefit of reducing overinvestment alongside more expected benefits of reducing underinvestment and increasing rates of promise keeping.

The form of legal regime that we study in this paper resembles legal enforcement that happens pursuant to the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts enforce gratuitous promises—promises for which the promisor received nothing in return—but only when they have been relied upon. The doctrine is also invoked to enforce promises that have been relied upon that are part of a bargained-for exchange, and therefore presumptively enforceable even absence reliance, when those promises would, in the absence of reliance, be rendered unenforceable for some other reason like lack of definiteness or a failure to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.\(^3\) Judges have discretion to determine the remedy when they find a promisor liable on promissory estoppel grounds. In particular, they can choose between Expectation Damages—the standard remedy for breach of contract—and Reliance Damages.\(^4\) But the scholarly consensus seems to be that Expectation Damages

---

\(^3\)See, e.g., Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W. 2d 736 (N.D. 1976).
\(^4\)See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981).
are more commonly awarded (Farber and Matheson, 1985; Yorio and Thel, 1991), and in this paper we study the effects of introducing a legal regime with Expectation Damages by contrasting it with a regime in which legal enforcement is absent.

Our subjects played a modified dictator game in which a Recipient first makes an investment decision and then a Dictator decides whether or not to “cooperate” with the Recipient. Cooperation always increases joint payoffs, but, in the absence of a legal regime, it reduces the Dictator’s payoff. Investment by the Recipient affects only his own payoffs in the absence of a legal regime. The way in which it does so depends on whether the Dictator cooperates with him. If the Dictator chooses the uncooperative action, then investment monotonically reduces the Recipient’s payoff. If the Dictator decides to cooperate, then investment first increases and then decreases the Recipient’s payoff, though the rate of decrease is lower than the rate of decrease when the Dictator is uncooperative. Thus, the payoff-maximizing level of investment is positive, but only if the Dictator cooperates.

Before subjects learned their roles in this game, each had the opportunity to make a promise to the other to cooperate in the event that he was chosen to be the Dictator. In our No Regime treatment, the Dictator suffered no penalty if she broke a promise to cooperate with the Recipient. In our Expectation Damages treatment, she suffered such a penalty if the Recipient had invested in reliance on this promise, as she was forced to pay the Recipient expectation damages.

Our formulation of the dictator’s utility function is in the spirit of Battigalli’s and Dufwenberg’s (2007, 2009) psychological game theoretic model of “guilt aversion,” in which agents experience guilt when their behavior falls short of another’s expectations. Building on experimental work by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
and Vanberg (2008), Ederer and Stremitzer (2015) obtain experimental evidence that shows that a promisor is more likely to keep her promise if the promisee had higher expectations that the promise would be kept. This suggests that second-order beliefs about the promisee’s own beliefs about the promisor’s actions enter some promisors’ utility functions. If promisors don’t like defeating another’s expectations, it is plausible to suppose that they also don’t like disappointing a promisee who has relied on a promise. This might be because a promisee’s reliance is an indicator of his confidence that the promisor will perform. But it also might be because the promisor doesn’t like to cause harm to the promisee by breaking a promise. Disappointed expectations are a particular kind of harm that can result from the breaking of a promise. Reliance-based harm is another. Our formulation of preferences is designed to capture a concern with avoiding the latter kind of reliance-based harm. We don’t suppose that a promisor is influenced by his beliefs about the promisee’s expectations, and so we don’t need to employ the apparatus of psychological game theory. Instead, we posit that a promisor’s guilt from breaking a promise depends on the extent of the promisee’s reliance on the promise.

There is an experimental literature examining the effects of legal enforcement on investment incentives. Slooff et al. (2003) and Slooff et al. (2006) obtain experimental evidence that shows that, consistent with the predictions of classical economic theory (e.g., Shavell, 1980), enforcement of contracts with expectation damages protects a promisee’s investment too well by encouraging overinvestment both when renegotiation is not possible (Slooff et al., 2003) and when renegotiation is possible (Slooff

---

5Ellingsen et al. (2010) find no evidence that a dictator’s beliefs about a recipient’s expectations influence her decisions. But in their setup, unlike the design in Ederer and Stremitzer (2015), dictators have no opportunity to make promises to one another.
et al., 2006). In their design, there is a chance that performance of the contract might be inefficient. Overinvestment occurs because expectation damages perfectly insure the promisee against the risk of breach, even in states of the world in which performance of the promise is inefficient. The promisee disregards this possibility when choosing his investment level and so invests the amount that would be desirable if performance were always efficient. Our design abstracts from this motive to overinvest by ensuring that promise-keeping is always efficient.

Subjects do not make promises in the experiments of Sloof et al. (2003) and Sloof et al. (2006). The contracts that they are imagined to have signed are simply given to them at the outset of the game. In our design, by contrast, promises arise endogenously as subjects can decide whether or not to make promises to one another. In this sense, our design more closely resembles that of Hoppe and Schmitz (2011), who find that option contracts improve investment incentives even when the option contract is not enforceable. The authors assume that these option contracts only arise if accepted by both parties. Their focus is, however, different from ours.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model from which we derive our theoretical predictions. Section 3 sets out our experimental design and formulates the specific hypotheses that we test. Section 4 presents our results, which are largely in line with our theoretical predictions. Section 5 offers a further discussion of our results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.

---

6Sloof and his coauthors also show that, consistent with theoretical predictions, reliance damages cause even more overinvestment. Reliance damages, like expectation damages, perfectly insure the investment decision against the possibility of breach. But, under reliance damages, the investor has an additional incentive to invest to reduce the likelihood of breach.
2 Theory

In this section, we develop the theoretical model that we use to generate the hypotheses that we test using the data from our experiment.

2.1 Modified Dictator Game

Two agents, the Dictator and the Recipient, play a game in which the Dictator must decide whether or not to cooperate with the Recipient after the Recipient chooses an investment level that only affects the Recipient’s payoffs. At the outset of the game, the Dictator decides whether to make a promise to cooperate with the Recipient, \( p \in \{0, 1\} \). This promise has no effect on material payoffs in the absence of legal enforcement. The Recipient then chooses an investment level \( i \in [0, \bar{i}] \). Finally, after observing the Recipient’s choice, the Dictator chooses an action \( a \in \{0, 1\} \) where \( a = 1 \) denotes the cooperative action.

**Assumption 1.** In the absence of a legal regime, the Recipient’s material payoff \( \pi_R (a, i) \) depends on both the investment level and the Dictator’s action, while the Dictator’s material payoff \( \pi_D (a) \) depends only on her action. Cooperation by the Dictator increases joint material payoffs \( W(a, i) \), but reduces the Dictator’s material payoff, and so increases the Recipient’s payoff. That is, for all \( i \):

\[
W(1, i) = \pi_R (1, i) + \pi_D (1) > \pi_R (0, i) + \pi_D (0) = W(0, i),
\]

and

\[
\pi_D (1) < \pi_D (0), \quad (1)
\]

and therefore

\[
\pi_R (1, i) > \pi_R (0, i). \quad (2)
\]
Assumption 2. In the absence of a legal regime, investment always reduces the Recipient’s material payoff if the Dictator doesn’t cooperate. But it first increases and then decreases the Recipient’s payoff if the Dictator cooperates, and decreases the Recipient’s payoff at a slower rate if the Dictator cooperates. Thus:

\[
\pi'_R (0, i) < 0, \quad (3)
\]

while

\[
\pi'_R (1, i) > 0 \text{ if } i \leq e, \quad (4)
\]

and

\[
\pi'_R (0, i) < \pi'_R (1, i) < 0 \text{ if } i > e \quad (5)
\]

where \( e \in (0, \bar{i}) \). It follows that the extent to which cooperation increases the Recipient’s material payoff is increasing in \( i \). That is:

\[
\pi'_R (1, i) - \pi'_R (0, i) > 0. \quad (6)
\]

Specification of the payoff function. While many of our results hold for general payoff functions satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, we will sometimes use specifications of the payoff functions that resemble those faced by subjects in our experiment.\(^7\) Consistent with Assumption 1 we assume that the Dictator’s material payoff is given by:

\[
\pi_R (a, i) = \begin{cases} 
15 & \text{if } a = 0 \\
12 & \text{if } a = 1 
\end{cases}, \quad (7)
\]

and the Recipient’s payoff is given by:

\[
\pi_R (a, i) = \begin{cases} 
6 - i & \text{if } a = 0 \\
12.25 - 0.25 |1 - i| & \text{if } a = 1 
\end{cases}, \quad (8)
\]

\(^7\) The only difference is that, in our experiment, we discretize the Recipient’s choice set \( i \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\} \).
where he can choose an investment level from $i \in [0, 6]$. Notice that, consistent with Assumption 2, investment always reduces the Recipient’s material payoff if the Dictator doesn’t cooperate. But it first increases (for $i \leq e = 1$) and then decreases the Recipient’s payoff (for $i > e = 1$) if the Dictator cooperates, and decreases the Recipient’s payoff at a slower rate if the Dictator cooperates.

### 2.2 Preferences

In line with the economic literature on promising, we posit preferences that allow for the possibility that a Dictator experiences guilt when she breaks a promise (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009).

**Assumption 3.** The Recipient’s overall utility $u_R$ is given simply by his own material payoff:

$$u_R(a, i) = \pi_R(a, i).$$

**Assumption 4.** The Dictator’s utility function $u_D$ is determined only in part by her material payoff. It also reflects a desire not to let the Recipient down in the event that she made a promise to cooperate with the Recipient. We capture this by positing that the Dictator’s utility is reduced if she breaks a promise by an amount that depends on the reduction of the Recipient’s material payoff that results from the broken promise. That is, her utility depends on her material payoff, and, if she made such a promise, the difference between the Recipient’s actual material payoff and the material payoff the Recipient would have received if she had kept her promise.\(^8\)

---

\(^8\)Because our focus is on the effects of reliance on promising, we abstract from other considerations that might drive agents to keep their promises like a desire not to disappoint promisees’ expectations (see Ederer and Stremitzer, 2015) or a simple desire to do as one promised.
We refer to latter component of the utility as the Dictator’s “guilt.” Formally, the Dictator’s utility is given by:

\[
 u_D(a, p) = \pi_D(a) - p\gamma g(\pi_R(1, i) - \pi_R(a, i)),
\]

(9)

where \( \gamma \geq 0 \) is a parameter that represents the degree of the Dictator’s guilt and \( g(x) \) is the guilt function with \( g(0) = 0 \) and \( g'(x) > 0 \). Guilt is therefore zero whenever the Dictator does not promise, \( p = 0 \), and whenever she cooperates, \( a = 1 \), so \( u_D(a, 0) = \pi_D(a) \) and \( u_D(1, 1) = \pi_D(1) \). Expression (6) implies that guilt from not keeping a promise increases in investment, so \( \frac{dg}{di} > 0 \) if \( a = 0 \).

2.3 Complete Information Equilibrium without Legal Enforcement

We now solve the game by backward induction for the equilibrium of this game without legal enforcement of promises \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) \). We begin by assuming that the Dictator’s preferences—in particular, her guilt parameter—are known to the Recipient. Later we will relax that assumption. We ignore for the moment the promise making stage of the game and so take the Dictator’s decision to make a promise or not as exogenous. We explain why we expect to see promises in equilibrium in Section 3 when we introduce the promise-generating technology that we use in the experiment.

---

\(^9\)The use of the term “guilt” suggests that the Dictator's psychological well-being is reduced when she breaks a promise. On this interpretation, guilt is a component of the social welfare function, \( W \). But we need not give it that interpretation: guilt might simply represent the strength of the non-self-interested considerations that the Dictator perceives give her reason to keep her promises, in which case “guilt” would not affect social welfare.
2.3.1 Equilibrium without Guilt

It is easy to see that social welfare is maximized if the Dictator cooperate, $a = 1$, and the Recipient invests 1. It is also easy to see that social welfare is maximized if the Dictator cooperates and the Recipient invests $e$. Proposition 1 summarizes. It follows immediately from Assumptions 1 and 2, and so it is stated without proof.

**Proposition 1** The social welfare maximizing outcome is given by $(a^*, i^*) = (1, e)$. Maximized social welfare is given by $W^* = W(1, e) = \pi_D(1) + \pi_R(1, e)$. For our particular specification of the payoff functions, $(a^*, i^*) = (1, 1)$ and $W^* = 24.25$.

As a benchmark, we also solve for the equilibrium when the Dictator experiences no guilt when she breaks a promise, $\gamma = 0$, and so cares only about her material payoff. It is straightforward to show that such a Dictator never cooperates and the Recipient, anticipating this, invests zero. Proposition 2 summarizes.

**Proposition 2** If both parties only care about material payoffs, then regardless of whether the Dictator made a promise to cooperate with the Recipient, the Recipient will invest zero, and the Dictator won’t cooperate: $(\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0)$. Social welfare is given by $\hat{W} = W(0, 0) = \pi_D(0) + \pi_R(0, 0)$. For our particular specification of the payoff functions, $\hat{W} = 21$.

**Proof.** If the Dictator chooses not to cooperate, it is optimal for the Recipient to choose zero investment given expression (3). If the Dictator chooses to cooperate, then expressions (4) and (5) imply that the recipient will choose $e$. But expression (1) implies that the Dictator’s dominant strategy is not to cooperate. ■

Thus, in the absence of guilt, the equilibrium falls short of the social optimum.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with Guilt

We will now analyze what happens if we allow guilt from breaking a promise to enter the Dictator’s utility function (see expression 9 above). The equilibrium of the game then depends on whether the Dictator made a promise and on the size of the guilt parameter \( \gamma \). If a Dictator made no promise, \( p = 0 \), or the sensitivity to guilt is zero, \( \gamma = 0 \), then since \( \pi_D (1) < \pi_D (0) \) the Dictator will not cooperate at the final stage. Anticipating this, the Recipient will invest zero, since \( \pi_R (0, i) \) is strictly decreasing in \( i \). If, by contrast, the Dictator made a promise, then the Dictator will cooperate whenever,

\[
\pi_D (1) \geq \pi_D (0) - \gamma g (\pi_R (1, i) - \pi_R (0, i)),
\]

that is, whenever the sensitivity to guilt, \( \gamma \), exceeds a critical value, \( \gamma^c (i) \), which depends on the investment level:

\[
\Leftrightarrow \gamma \geq \gamma^c (i) = \frac{\pi_D (0) - \pi_D (1)}{g (\pi_R (1, i) - \pi_R (0, i))}. \tag{10}
\]

First, note that the social optimum is unaffected by the introduction of guilt into the Dictator’s utility function. Because guilt is zero when the Dictator cooperates, social welfare is still maximized when the Dictator cooperates and the Recipient invests \( e \). And because guilt is zero, the social optimum is the same irrespective of whether we include the Dictator’s guilt in the social welfare function. Proposition 3 summarizes. It is stated without proof, since it follows immediately from Assumption 4 and Proposition 1.
Proposition 3  The social welfare maximizing outcome is given by \((a^*, i^*) = (1, e)\) regardless of whether or not we include guilt in the social welfare function and regardless of the value of \(\gamma\). Maximized social welfare is given by \(W^* = W(1, e)\).

However, the equilibrium outcome of the game may differ from the no-guilt equilibrium. First, promising now matters, as breaking a promise triggers guilt. Second, the Dictator’s utility is no longer independent of the Recipient’s investment choice. The guilt experienced from breaking a promise increases in investment. And so, if the Dictator made a promise she will be more inclined to keep her promise if investment was high than if it was low. Third, this might invite the Recipient to strategically invest in order to psychologically lock the Dictator in to keeping her promise. We know from expression (6) that increasing investment \(i\) increases \(\pi_R(1, i) - \pi_R(0, i)\) and so, given (10), reduces \(\gamma^c(i)\), which may thereby compel the Dictator to keep her promise depending on the value of \(\gamma\). Proposition 4 shows how the equilibrium depends on the guilt parameter.

Proposition 4  Equilibrium, \((\hat{a}, \hat{i})\), in the absence of a legal regime:
If the Dictator made no promise to cooperate, then the equilibrium is the same as in the absence of guilt, \((\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0)\). If the Dictator made a promise to cooperate, then:

(i) for low sensitivity to guilt, \(\gamma < \gamma^c(\bar{i})\), the Dictator never cooperates and the Recipient always invests zero, \((\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0)\);

(ii) for high sensitivity to guilt, \(\gamma \geq \gamma^c(e)\), the Dictator always cooperates and the Recipient always chooses the first-best investment level, \((\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (1, e)\);

(iii) for intermediate sensitivity to guilt, \(\gamma^c(\bar{i}) \leq \gamma < \gamma^c(e)\), the Recipient will
initially invest for equal to the lower bound \( \gamma^c (\bar{r}) \) and as \( \gamma \) decreases, he will then decrease investment approaching and investment of \( e \) as \( \gamma \) approaches the upper bound \( \gamma^c (e) \), that is, the Recipient overinvest in order to psychologically lock-in the Dictator and the Dictator will cooperate, \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (1, i^c) \) so long as \( \pi_R (1, i^c) > \pi_R (0, 0) \). Otherwise, the Recipient is better off not to invest and the Dictator will not cooperate \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0) \).

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

![Equilibrium Investment as function of \( \gamma \).](image)

Figure 2: No Regime: Equilibrium Investment as function of \( \gamma \).

We see from Propositions 3 and 4 that once we introduce guilt into the Dictator’s utility function, there are several possibilities depending on the size of the guilt parameter (see Figure 2 summarizing Proposition 4 assuming a linear guilt function and the specification of the payoff functions that we used in our experiment). If the guilt parameter is so low that the Dictator wouldn’t cooperate even if the Recipient chose the maximum investment level, then the Recipient won’t invest and the Dictator won’t cooperate (case i). The resulting equilibrium is indistinguishable from
the equilibrium that results when Dictators only care about their material payoffs, and the agents fail to achieve the first-best. If the Dictator’s guilt parameter is high enough that investing the efficient amount is sufficient to induce the Dictator to cooperate, then the Recipient will invest the efficient amount and the Dictator will cooperate (case ii). The result is that the equilibrium outcome maximizes social welfare. If the Dictator’s guilt parameter is in an intermediate range, the Recipient will invest more than the efficient level by an amount that is sufficient to induce the Dictator to cooperate (case iii). \(^{10}\) Thus, guilt can also produce a new kind of inefficiency: overinvestment motivated by the Recipient’s desire to psychologically lock-in the Dictator.

### 2.4 Complete Information Equilibrium with Legal Enforcement

Introducing a legal regime with expectation damages that enforces relied-upon promises forces the Dictator to make a payment to the Recipient in the event she breaks a promise and the Recipient relied on the promise by choosing a positive investment level. Specifically, we assume the following:

**Assumption 5.** If the Dictator made a promise, and the Recipient made a positive investment in reliance of the promise, a dictator who breaks her promise must make a payment \(l(i)\) to the Recipient sufficient to ensure that the Recipient is as well off in material terms as if the Dictator had kept her promise (expectation

\(^{10}\)This result only obtains if the Recipient’s payoff when he invests the amount required to induce the Dictator to cooperate is not reduced below the payoff he would receive were he to invest zero. If this condition does not obtain, then the Recipient chooses a zero investment level and the Dictator won’t cooperate.
damages):

\[ l(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = 0 \\ \pi_R(1,i) - \pi_R(0,i) & \text{if } i > 0 \end{cases} . \]

If the Dictator choses not to cooperate the Dictator’s payoffs are therefore:

\[ \pi^L_D(0,i) = \pi_D(0) - l(i) = \begin{cases} \pi_D(0) & \text{if } i = 0 \\ \pi_D(0) - l(i) & \text{if } i > 0 \end{cases} , \]

and the Recipient’s payoffs are:

\[ \pi^L_R(0,i) = \pi_R(0,i) + l(i) = \begin{cases} \pi_R(0,0) & \text{if } i = 0 \\ \pi_R(1,i) & \text{if } i > 0 \end{cases} . \]

Payoffs are unchanged if the Dictator cooperates. Thus:

\[ \pi^L_D(1,i) = \pi_D(1) , \]

and

\[ \pi^L_R(1,i) = \pi_R(1,i) . \]

Assumption 5 implies that \( \pi^L_R(0,i) = \pi^L_R(1,i) \) so long as \( i > 0 \). That is, given that the recipient chooses a positive investment level, the Recipient will always receive \( \pi_R(1,i) \), regardless whether the Dictator cooperates or not. Thus, it is easy to see that the investment level maximizing the Recipient’s payoff is the socially optimal investment level, \( 1 \)\(^{11} \). Because the Recipient’s payoff is unaffected by the Dictator’s action if he relied on the Dictator’s promise, the Dictator experiences no guilt if she breaks a promise since the Recipient’s payoffs are unaffected by the Dictator’s decision: \( u^L_D(a,1,i) = \pi^L_D(a,i) \) so long as \( i > 0 \). Thus, the equilibrium \( \left( \hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L \right) \) in

\(^{11}\)Note that we do not assume that there might be states of the world where cooperation is inefficient. Hence, contrary to the classic models of Shavell (1980, 84), Cooter and Eisenberg (1985) and others, expectation damages won’t produce overinvestment in our model.
the event that the Dictator made a promise to cooperate is that the Recipient will choose 1 and the Dictator will cooperate. Proposition 5 summarizes.

**Proposition 5** Equilibrium, $(\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L)$, when relied-upon promises are enforced with expectation damages: (i) If the Dictator made no promise to cooperate, then the Recipient will not invest and the Dictator will not cooperate, $(\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (0, 0)$. (ii) If the Dictator made a promise to cooperate, parties achieve the first-best, $(\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (a^*, i^*) = (1, e)$. For our specification we get $(\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (1, 1)$.

**Proof.** Because there is no legal enforcement in the absence of a promise (i) follows immediately from Proposition 2. (ii) If the Recipient invests 0 there is no legal enforcement and the Dictator will choose not to cooperate. If the Recipient chooses positive investment it follows from Assumption 5 that his payoff will be $\pi_R (1, i)$ no matter the Dictator’s action. As $\max_{i \in [0, 6]} \pi_R (1, i) = \pi_R (1, 1) > \pi_R (0, 0)$ the Recipient’s dominant strategy is to chose the first-best investment level 1. The Dictator’s payoff therefore be written as $\pi_D^L (1, 1) = W^* - \pi_R (1, 1)$ if she cooperates and $\pi_D^L (0, 1) = W(0, e) - \pi_R (1, 1)$ if she chooses not to cooperate. By the definition of $W^*$ if must be that $\pi_D^L (1, 1) > \pi_D^L (0, 1)$, so that it is optimal for the Dictator to cooperate, $(\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (1, 1)$. ■

In other words, under the legal regime, the promisee can rely on the legal regime to lock in the promisor. He therefore does not need to overinvest in order to psychologically lock in the promisor. Thus, legal enforcement allows the agents to achieve the first best.
2.5 Imperfect Information about the Dictator’s Type

So far we have been assuming that the Recipient knows the Dictator’s preferences. In reality, it is likely that the Dictator is drawn from a population of agents with heterogeneous preferences, and that the Recipient will therefore be uncertain about the preferences—in particular, the guilt parameter—of the particular Dictator he faces. The above analysis continues to apply to such a situation if we assume that the Recipient assigns a point estimate of $\gamma$ to the Dictator so that he acts as if he knows the Dictator’s type. But it is more natural to represent a Recipient’s beliefs by a probability distribution over the possible Dictator types.

If the Recipient is uncertain about the Dictator’s type, then, in the absence of a legal regime, the expected utility of the Recipient, if he has received a promise, is given by:

$$U_R (i) = E [\pi_R (a, i)]$$

$$= P (\gamma < \gamma^c (i)) \pi_R (0, i) + (1 - P (\gamma < \gamma^c (i))) \pi_R (1, i)$$

$$= \pi_R (1, i) \pi_R (0, i) + (1 - P (\gamma < \gamma^c (i))) (\pi_R (1, i) - \pi_R (0, i)),$$

where $P (\gamma < \gamma^c (i))$ is a function describing the probability he assigns to the Dictator’s guilt parameter being smaller than the critical value that would induce her to cooperate. Notice that the probability a recipient should rationally assign to cooperation, $1 - P_r (\gamma < \gamma^c (i))$, is decreasing in $\gamma^c (i)$, and therefore rising in $i$. Choosing higher investment therefore has two countervailing effects on the Recipient’s expected utility. It reduces his utility for any given action of the dictator. But it might also increase the likelihood that the dictator will cooperate. This is because, increasing investment reduces $\gamma^c (i)$, the critical value of the guilt parameter beyond which the
dictator will rationally cooperate. Assuming that the distribution of Dictator’s sensitivity to guilt assigns positive probability mass to subsets of intermediate and/or high guilt types, Proposition 6 immediately follows:

**Proposition 6** *Given that the Dictator made a promise, then in the absence of the legal regime: (i) cooperation rates will increase as investment increases; and (ii) the Recipient will rationally assign a higher probability to cooperation as investment increases.*

In the Appendix, we work through a specific example where there are three Dictator types: a low-guilt type who never cooperates; an intermediate-guilt type who cooperates if the Recipient overinvests; and a high-guilt type who cooperates regardless of the Recipient’s investment level. Using the payoff specifications that we use in the experiment and a linear guilt function, we show that the Recipient will optimally overinvest so long as the likelihood that the Dictator is of an intermediate-type is sufficiently high.

Uncertainty about the Dictator’s type has no effect on the equilibrium in the presence of the expectation damages regime. This is because the legal regime ensures that no matter what the Dictator’s type, the Recipient can ensure that the Dictator cooperates by choosing the first-best investment.

In the following sections we will put our theory to an experimental test.

---

12 In Appendix A, we explore the case of uncertainty over Dictator types by using a simple example.
3 Experimental Design & Procedure

3.1 Design

In each round of the experiment, subjects were first randomly and anonymously matched with another subject. They then played a modified dictator game that resembles the game described in Section 2 and is depicted in Figure 1.

Two features of our design differentiate it from a standard dictator game. First, before subjects learned their role as either the Dictator (“Player A”) or the Recipient (“Player B”), each subject had the opportunity to promise to send the Recipient money (the “cooperative” action) in the event that she was chosen to be the Dictator. Second, after subjects had learned their role for the round, the Recipient had to make his investment decision before the Dictator chose whether to send money or not.

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi^D(1) &= 12 \\
\pi^R(0, i) &= 12.25 - 0.25(1 - i) \\
\pi^D(0) &= 15 \\
\pi^R(0, i) &= 6 - i
\end{align*}
\]
Notice that in the No Regime treatment, the investment decision affected only the Recipient’s payoffs. Thus, the Dictator had no reciprocity based reason to reward the Recipient for a positive investment choice. This was important because our aim is to isolate the effects of reliance alone on promise keeping. In both treatments, basic material payoffs in the absence of legal enforcement are given by (7) and (8). The only difference is that we made the Recipient’s choice set discrete rather than continuous: \( i \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\} \).

In all treatments, we used the strategy method to elicit the Dictator’s cooperation decision (Selten, 1967). The Dictator made his choice in ignorance of the Recipient’s investment choice by indicating whether or not she wanted to cooperate for each possible investment level that the Recipient might have chosen. The Dictator’s actual choice (and therefore the players’ final payoffs) was then determined by the investment level that the Recipient actually chose. If, for example, the Recipient chose to invest three, then the Dictator’s action was the action he indicated he wanted to choose in the event that the Recipient chose an investment of three.

We also elicited the Recipient’s beliefs about the choices the Dictator would make. Before the Recipient made his investment decision, we asked him to indicate how confident he was that the Dictator would choose to cooperate with him for each of the available investment levels (see Table 2 in the Appendix B).

During our communication stage, subjects exchanged computer-coded messages. One randomly-selected subject in each pair (Participant 1) first had to decide whether to promise to send money to the other subject (Participant 2) in the event he was chosen to be the Dictator. This promise was conditional on Participant 2 making a return promise. Participant 2 could then choose whether or not to make a similar
promise to send money in the event he was chosen to be a Dictator in return.\footnote{Figure 6 in Appendix B shows which participants ended up making a promise depending on the messages sent during the communication stage. This design of the communication stage is similar to Vanberg (2008). The main difference is that Vanberg used free-form messages, allowing subjects to exchange a sequence of instant messages. The advantage of computer-coded messages is that they more accurately capture promise-making without confounding it with other meaningful social interaction. The disadvantage of computer-coded messages is that they lead to lower effect sizes (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011).} Subjects had reasons to make promises because the communication stage took place before they learned their roles. In No Regime, promising was cheap talk, so there was no monetary cost associated with making a promise. However, there was a potential benefit if making a promise was interpreted as a kind act that subjects then reciprocated with kindness by cooperating if they ended up in the role of Dictator.

In Expectation Damages, promising was no longer cheap talk, but making a promise was likely to yield a promise in return, which was beneficial for subjects in the event they ended up in the role of Recipient.

Alternatively, we could have used a version of the trust game that resembles our modified Dictator game, except that it gives the Recipient the opportunity to opt out of the game at the outset and the Dictator alone the opportunity of making a promise to cooperate with the Recipient at the outset of the game after the subjects’ roles are revealed to them. Opting out gives both parties their outside options, which are less than the payoffs they might realize in the subsequent modified dictator game if the Dictator cooperates, but the Recipient’s outside option exceeds the payoff that he will receive if the Dictator decides not to cooperate with him. The trust game therefore gives the Dictator a clear reason to make a promise: if the Recipient takes her at her word, then the Recipient will opt in, which benefits the Dictator (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2009). Since in our design...
subjects’ promises took a conditional form—“I promise to cooperate if I am chosen to be the Dictator”—the promises that were made in our experiment are arguably more artificial than the promises that dictators make in a trust game. But many promises in the real world have a conditional form. Insurance contracts, for example, always involve conditional promises. In our design, subjects effectively made promises to insure each other against the risk that each might end up in the vulnerable position of the Recipient. Most importantly, however, the trust game design was unsuitable for our purposes as it involves two reliance decisions: the Recipient’s opt-in decision and his subsequent investment decision. Thus, a Recipient who opts in has relied on the promise by forgoing his outside option, even if he subsequently invests zero. And so, had we used the trust game, we wouldn’t have been able to observe what happens if the Recipient decided not to rely on a promise. Furthermore, we would have only observed the effects of reliance on promising among recipients who opt in to the game. This subset of subjects may not be representative of the subject population, since recipients who opt in are likely to be more optimistic about the likelihood that the Dictator will cooperate than those that don’t. In our setup, by contrast, all recipients make an investment decision. Finally, what matters is that subjects understand the messages that they send and receive to be promises and we have clear evidence that this is the case.

\[14\]

\[14\] In [No Regime v. Control] we compare behavior of subjects in No Regime to the behavior of subjects in a Control treatment in which subjects play the modified dictator game without the prior communication stage, and we show that promising matters for behavior.
3.2 Hypotheses

We are now in a position to formulate the hypotheses that flow from our theoretical model. First, we predict that behavior in the absence of a legal regime will depart significantly from the predictions of the classical model. More specifically, we predict that the rate of cooperation in No Regime will exceed zero, and that, anticipating cooperative behavior on the part of dictators, recipients will be willing to invest.

**Hypothesis 1** Cooperate in No Regime will exceed zero (H1.1). The rate of investment in No Regime will exceed zero (H1.2).

**Explanation:** Since we predict that many dictators will make promises, it is optimal for dictators who made a promise to cooperate if they have high guilt parameters or, if recipients are willing to invest enough to induce them to cooperate, intermediate guilt parameters. Thus, H1.1 follows so long as there some dictators with sufficiently large guilt parameters (see Proposition 4). H1.2. follows so long as some recipients are confident that the dictator population consists of enough dictators with sufficiently large guilt parameters.

Second, we predict that dictators will become more willing to cooperate as investment increases and that recipients’ will anticipate this effect.

**Hypothesis 2** Hypothetical cooperation rates will increase in No Regime as investment increases (H2.1). Recipients exhibit a higher degree of confidence that dictators will cooperate as investment increases in No Regime (H2.2).
**Explanation:** Hypothesis 2 immediately follows from Proposition 6 as we predict that many dictators will make promises.\(^{15}\)

Third, we predict that recipients will strategically overinvest in No Regime in order to psychologically lock-in the dictator, while they will not do so under Expectation Damages. We also expect to see less underinvestment in Expectation Damages and more efficient investment, since recipients who received a promise can give dictators a sufficient self-interested reason to rely simply by investing one, the efficient level of investment. And we expect to see more overall cooperation in Expectation Damages.

**Hypothesis 3** The incidence and magnitude of overinvestment will be higher in No Regime than in Expectation Damages (H3.1). There will be less underinvestment and more efficient investment in Expectation Damages than in No Regime (H3.2).

**Explanation:** H3.1 follows from our model so long as some recipients hold beliefs that make overinvestment rational. That is, some recipients believe that there is a high chance of facing a dictator with an intermediate guilt parameter that makes him willing to cooperate but only if investment is greater than one. H3.2 follows from our model so long as similar numbers of promises are made in Expectation Damages as in No Regime, recipients aren’t too confident that they face high-guilt dictators who will cooperate regardless of the investment level, and/or recipients are sufficiently confident that they face intermediate-guilt dictators.

Fourth, we predict that there will be higher rates of cooperation in Expectation Damages than in No Regime.

---

\(^{15}\)In our example in Appendix A, the likelihood that the Recipient assigns to the Dictator cooperating is \(p_3\) if he invests less than 2, and \(p_2 + p_3\) if he invests more than or equal to 2.
Hypothesis 4  The cooperation rate will be higher in Expectation Damages than in No Regime.

Explanation: H4 follows from Propositions 8 and 7 so long as there are some low-guilt dictators who won’t cooperate in the absence of legal enforcement regardless of the investment level, and a similar number of promises are made in Expectation Damages and No Regime.

Finally, we expect that the above will all entail that Expectation Damages will do better than No Regime in terms of overall payoffs.

Hypothesis 5  Joint payoffs will be higher under Expectation Damages than under No Regime (H5.1). Average payoff differentials will be lower under Expectation Damages than under No Regime (H5.2).

Explanation: H5.1 and H5.2 will follow if the above predictions are confirmed. This is because these predictions entail that investment decisions will be superior and rates of cooperation higher under Expectation Damages.

3.3 Procedure

We conducted 9 experimental sessions with a total of 140 student subjects. We used a between subject design, so subjects participated in only one treatment: 70 subjects participated in our Expectation Damages treatment and 70 subjects in our No Regime treatment.

The experimental sessions were conducted at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (XLab) at the University of California, Berkeley and the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory (EBEL) at the University of California, Santa
Barbara  The XLab subject pool consists of undergraduate students at UC Berkeley, and the EBEL subject pool consists of undergraduate students at UC Santa Barbara.

Subjects were assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. Beside each terminal they found paper instructions, which are reproduced in Appendix C. Instructions were read aloud to subjects and questions were answered individually and confidentially at the subjects’ seats. The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).

Each session consisted of two unpaid practice rounds followed by eight rounds, one of which was randomly chosen at the end of the experiment for payment based on the subjects’ decisions in that round. Subjects were paid on average $11.2 with earnings ranging between $0 and $15. In each round, subjects were anonymously matched with a randomly chosen participant. No participant interacted with the same participant more than once in any of the latter eight rounds. We achieved this by creating matching groups of exactly 10 subjects and having each subject play against the same participant during the two practice rounds. We also elicited recipients beliefs about the likelihood their dictators would cooperate with them. In order to elicit beliefs in an incentive-compatible way, we paid recipients for their beliefs in accordance with Table 2 in Appendix B in a randomly selected round. We selected a different round from the round selected for payment based on subjects’ decisions so that subjects had no reason to change their behavior in any of the rounds to hedge their bets. Subjects also received a fixed fee of $5 for showing up on time, $5 for completing a post-experiment survey, and an additional sum ranging between $0 and $4.55 (on average $1) depending on how they did on a post-experiment cognitive reflection test. Each round consisted of four steps.
**Step 1:** At the outset of the round, subjects were randomly and anonymously matched with another subject. Each subject in each pair then had the opportunity to exchange messages with one another sequentially in a randomly determined order. The participant who was selected to make the first communication decision (Participant 1) had to decide whether or not to send Message 1 to the other participant (Participant 2): “I promise to send you money if I am chosen to be Player A so long as you make me a return promise.” After learning of Participant 1’s decision, Participant 2 then had to decide whether or not to send Message 2 to Participant 1: “I promise to send you money if I am chosen to be Player A.” Notice that the conditional form of Message 1 means that Participant 1 only ends up promising to send Participant 2 money if Participant 2 makes a promise in return.\(^{16}\)

**Step 2:** Once this communication stage was over, subjects learned whether they had been selected to be the Dictator (Player A) or the Recipient (Player B). Roles were randomly assigned anew in each round.

**Step 3:** The Recipient then made his investment decision by selecting a level from zero to six. Prior to making this decision, he had to indicate his level of confidence that the Dictator would cooperate with him by sending money for each of the investment levels that he might have chosen. Table 2 in Appendix B shows how the Recipient’s payoffs from guessing was determined for a given investment level as a function of his stated confidence level and the dictator’s actions.\(^{17}\)

**Step 4:** After the Recipient made his investment decision, the Dictator then had to decide whether or not to cooperate by sending the Recipient money. Since we used

\(^{16}\)See Figure 6 in Appendix B.

\(^{17}\)We use the belief elicitation mechanism used by Vanberg (2009).
the strategy method, the Dictator made this decision in ignorance of the Recipient’s actual choice by indicating, for every possible investment level that the Recipient might have chosen, whether he wanted to cooperate or not. The Dictator’s actual choice, and therefore the final payoffs of both players, was given by the Dictator’s choice for the Recipient’s chosen investment level. At the very end of the round, the subjects learn the payoffs that each would earn during that round if it was randomly selected for payment based on their actions or the Recipient’s beliefs.

Given the complexity of the experiment, we took various steps to ensure that subjects understood the game. First, after reading the instructions aloud, subjects had to complete two preliminary questions that tested their understanding of the relationship between the players’ actions and their payoffs. Subjects answers were checked and wrong answers were corrected to make sure that the subjects understood where they had gone wrong. Second, the two practice rounds, which were designed so that subjects would experience both the role of Player A and Player B, gave subjects the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the game and the program interface before they played for money. Finally, in the post-experiment survey, we asked subjects whether they felt that they understood the payoff consequences of their actions. They could answer: “Yes”, “No”, or “Kind of.” We introduced the “Kind of” category as we thought that forcing subjects to choose between “Yes” and “No” was too crude, and we wanted to identify subjects whose understanding was only partial. We excluded subjects who answered “Kind of” and “No” from our data. This left us with 54 subjects in No Regime and 57 subjects in Expectation Damages.
4 Results

The data consist of 14 matching groups and a total of 111 subjects—54 subjects in No Regime and 57 subjects in Expectation Damages—after excluding subjects who reported that they didn’t fully understand the game. Each session lasted for 8 rounds. Thus, we have a total of 432 decisions made under No Regime and 456 decisions made under Expectation Damages. However, each matching group consists of only one independent observation. Thus, while the results we report are based on data from all sessions and all rounds, our nonparametric tests are based on matching-group averages of the relevant variables.

**Opportunism is not as prevalent as the classical model predicts.** First, consistent with much other empirical evidence, we find that the self-interested, rational actor model overestimates the importance of opportunism and so overstates the need for legal enforcement of relied-upon promises. Dictators cooperate 40.3% of the time under No Regime, despite the fact that they lack a sufficient, self-interested reason to do so, and this rate of cooperation is significantly different from zero ($p<0.01$, two-tailed t-test; $p=0.02$, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (H1.1). Recipients, moreover, seem to anticipate this cooperative behavior. Average investment is equal to 1.00 under No Regime, and this is significantly different from zero ($p<0.01$, two-tailed t-test; $p=0.02$, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (H 1.2).

**A legal regime with expectation damages generates superior investment decisions.** More interesting is our finding that enforcing relied-upon promises with expectation damages induces unambiguously superior investment decisions (see
Figure 3 and Table 1). Unsurprisingly, there is less underinvestment in Expectation Damages than in No Regime—32.9% compared to 55.6%—and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) (H3.2). There is also more efficient investment in Expectation Damages than in No Regime—58.8% compared to 21.8%—and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) (H3.2). But crucially, there is also less overinvestment in Expectation Damages than in No Regime—8.3% compared to 22.7%—and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Moreover, average investment conditional on overinvesting is also lower under Expectation Damages—2.42 compared to 3.45—and the difference is statistically significant (p=0.02, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). These results suggest that the magnitude as well as the incidence of overinvestment is reduced by the introduction of a legal regime with expectation damages: more people overinvest and they overinvest more on average in the absence of a legal regime (H3.1). Indeed, the average increment of overinvestment—a measure that combines both the incidence and magnitude of overinvestment—\(^{18}\) is also considerably lower under Expectation Damages than under No Regime—0.12 compared to 0.56—and the difference is again statistically significant (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).

These results are all consistent with our posited psychological lock-in effect. Some dictators are more willing to cooperate in No Regime the more their recipient has relied on a promise, and recipients anticipate this by overinvesting. In Expectation Damages, by contrast, there is no need to overinvest in order to increase a dictator’s guilt from breaking a promise, because the legal regime ensures that a dictator has

\(^{18}\)We compute this measure by taking the mean of the increment by which actual investment exceeds the efficient level of one.
a sufficient self-interested reason to keep her promise, so long as the recipient invests at least one, the efficient level.

**Overinvestment under No Regime appears to be driven by a psychological lock-in effect.** If this psychological lock-in effect is really driving our results, then we should expect to see that dictators do in fact become more willing to cooperate and recipients become more confident that dictators will cooperate when
recipients overinvest as Hypothesis 2 predicts. We have data to test this hypoth-
thesis because we employed the strategy method to elicit the dictators’ preferences
for all possible investment levels, and we elicited recipients’ beliefs about the likeli-
hood that a dictator will cooperate for all possible investment levels. Our theoretical
model suggests that some dictators will prefer to keep their promises regardless of
the investment level, others will prefer to keep their promises only when investment
exceeds a certain level, while others will never cooperate regardless of the investment
level. The psychological lock-in effect depends on the existence of this intermediate
group of dictators whose preferences depend on their investment level.

To test Hypothesis 2 we therefore exclude those whose behavior is invariant to
the investment level. We then compare average hypothetical cooperation rates in No
Regime for levels of investment at and below the efficient level (i.e. investment of zero
and one) with average hypothetical cooperation rates for levels of investment above
the efficient level. (These cooperation rates are “hypothetical” in the sense that
they only determine the actual rates of cooperation in conjunction with recipients’
investment choices.) We find that average hypothetical cooperation rates increase
from 9.5% to 16.0%. This difference is statistically significant (p=0.03, Wilcoxon
sign-rank test; p<0.05, two-sided t-test) (H2.1). We also find that the average conﬁ-
dence of also recipients in No Regime increases from 1.9 to 2.2 when we average over
the same investment levels. This difference is also statistically significant (p=0.02,
Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p=0.02, two-sided t-test) (H2.2).

**Introducing a legal regime increases rates of cooperation** Cooperation
rates are higher under Expectation Damages than No Regime: 62.3% compared
to 40.3%. The difference is statistically significant (p=0.02, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) (Hypothesis 4). This is not particularly surprising. So long as dictators make promises, thus ensuring that there is legal enforcement of relied-upon promises, this result is consistent with the predictions of the standard self-interested rational-actor model as well as our model in which dictators experience guilt from breaking their promises. Indeed, the differences are more stark when we focus only on dictators who made a promise: 93.2% cooperate under Expectation Damages, while 47.5% cooperate under No Regime, and, again, the difference is statistically significant (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). By contrast, there is no statistically significant difference in cooperation rates among dictators who didn’t make a promise: 7.7% cooperate under No Regime compared to 7.3% under Expectation Damages.

These results, however, mask one difference in hypothetical cooperation rates that would not be predicted by the standard model. In the event the legal regime is not triggered because a recipient invests zero, hypothetical cooperation rates are considerably lower under Expectation Damages than under No Regime: 18.9% compared to 40.7% in aggregate, and 24.7% compared to 46.9% among dictators who made a promise. Both differences are statistically significant (p=0.02 and p<0.05 respectively, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). (Among dictators who didn’t make a promise, the difference is not statistically significant.) This suggests that the presence of a legal regime crowds out voluntary promise-keeping. In the terms of the model, the legal regime seems to reduce the guilt of dictators, holding payoffs constant (i.e., it seems to reduce the guilt parameter γ). Recipients, moreover, anticipate this effect. Average recipient confidence for zero investment is higher under No Regime than Expectation Damages: 1.8 compared to 1.1 in aggregate, and 2.1 compared to 1.4
among dictators who made a promise. Both differences are statistically significant (p=0.03 for both, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).

This crowding out seems unlikely to have a large effect on overall cooperation rates, however, since recipients can avoid the effect, and guarantee the optimal result, by investing one if they received a promise. Indeed, the data confirm that this crowding out largely occurs off the equilibrium path. In Expectation Damages, only 4.0% of recipients underinvest if they received a promise (compared to 52.2% in No Regime and 89.6% in Expectation Damages if there was no promise).

Introducing a legal regime increases joint payoffs and reduces payoff differences. The improved investment decisions and higher cooperation rates that result from introducing the legal regime result in higher joint payoffs. Average joint payoffs are $22.9 under Expectation Damages compared to $21.7 under No Regime and the difference is significant (p=0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The difference is even starker when we look only at subject pairs where the dictator made a promise: $23.9 compared to $21.9 (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). (There is no statisti-
cally significant difference in average joint payoffs among subject pairs in which the dictator didn’t make a promise.) (H5.1)

The introduction of a legal regime also reduces average payoff differences between dictators and recipients in subject pairs from $5.90 to $3.15, a statistically significant reduction (p=0.02, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The difference is even more marked when we focus on subject pairs in which the dictator made a promise: $5.3 compared to $0.1 (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). (Again, there is no statistically significant difference in average joint payoffs among subject pairs in which the dictator didn’t make a promise.) Average payoff differences are a measure of risk resulting from opportunism. Before subjects are assigned their roles, they don’t know whether they will be in the position of the dictator or recipient—that is, they don’t know whether they will be in a position to exploit the other subject or instead be exploited. Our results suggest that at this ex ante stage, a risk-averse subject would prefer Expectation Damages to No Regime, since it reduces the risk that he will be exploited by the other ex post. (H5.2)

5 Discussion

Our results suggest that, even in the absence of a legal regime that enforces relied-upon promises, a promisee’s reliance on a promise makes the promisor more likely to keep the promise. Promisees, moreover, seem to anticipate this effect and so strategically rely on promises in order to make their promisors more likely to keep their promises. As a result, enforcing relied-upon promises with expectation damages has the unexpected effect of reducing overinvestment, as well as reducing the incidence of underinvestment and increasing the incidence of efficient investment, and increas-
ing rates of cooperation. This result cannot be explained by assuming that subjects have standard, self-interested preferences. But it is consistent with our model of guilt-averse agents where guilt from breaking a promise increases in the promisee’s reliance on the promise.

It is notable that Expectation Damages generates superior investment and cooperation decisions to No Regime, even though Expectation Damages causes a reduction in the numbers of promises that get made: 82% of subjects make promises under No Regime compared to 64% under Expectation Damages. The difference is significant only at 10% however (p=0.06, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This reduction in promise making is unsurprising given that promises are no longer cheap-talk under Expectation Damages. But the fact that we observe this reduction doesn’t undermine any of our results: we would expect Expectation Damages to do even better if promise rates were the same across the two regimes.

Could inequity aversion rather than reliance be driving the positive relationship between reliance and cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003)? Investing one gives the dictator a payoff of 12 and the recipient a payoff of 12.25 if the dictator cooperates (and 15 and 5 respectively if the dictator doesn’t cooperate), while overinvesting slightly by investing 2 yields both dictator and recipient a payoff of 12 if the dictator cooperates (and 15 and 4 respectively if the dictator doesn’t cooperate). So aversion to disadvantageous inequity could make a dictator more willing to cooperate if investment is two than if investment is one. Comparing cooperation rates when investment is equal to zero with investment rates when investment is equal to 2 allows us to isolate the effects of reliance from the effects of inequity aversion, because payoffs are equalized when a dictator cooperates at both investment levels and
so inequity aversion should be absent. If reliance alone made dictators more willing
to cooperate, cooperation should be higher at investment level two. In accordance
with this prediction, hypothetical cooperation rates are higher at investment level
two than at investment level zero: 17.1% compared to 9.9%. The difference is not,
however, quite significant at 10% under the Wilcoxon sign-rank test, though it is
nearly so (p=0.102). Average recipient confidence is also higher at investment level
2 than at investment level zero–2.0 compared to 1.9–and the difference is statistically
significant at 10% (p=0.06, Wilcoxon sign-rank test).

As we explained above, we went to considerable lengths to try to make sure that
subjects understood the game. Of course, the question remains whether they did in
fact understand the game. Figures 4 and 5 suggest that they do. These graphs show
that in Expectation Damages cooperation rises sharply at an investment level of
one when a promise was made and remain high for higher investment levels and that
recipients become close to completely confident that a dictator will cooperate as soon
as investment is equal to one or higher when a promise was made. Under No Regime,
by contrast, hypothetical cooperation and recipients’ average confidence levels rise
more steadily as investment increases consistent with our posited psychological lock-
in effect.

Finally, a possible limitation of our results is that we obtained our data using the
strategy method, which means that we elicited dictators’ preferences for all possi-
ble investment levels, including those not actually chosen by the recipient. We could
have instead simply asked dictators to make their selection after observing the invest-
ment level that the recipient in fact chose. Though employing this “direct-response”
method would have generated considerably less data, it more closely resembles real-
world choice situations, and it is natural to wonder whether it would have generated the same results.

While this is an important question, there is no reason to expect that we would have obtained qualitatively different results had we employed the direct-response method. Based on a survey of experimental studies that employ both methods, Brandts and Charness (2011) find that “there are significantly more studies that find no difference across elicitation methods than studies that find a difference” (p. 387). Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that the strategy method worked against us. If dictators feel more guilty when breaking a promise the larger was the recipient’s level of investment, they may feel this guilt more strongly when they know for sure that the result of their decision will be to break that promise. As Brandts and Charness (2011) note, there is some evidence that emotions run higher when decisions are elicited under the direct-response method.

6 Conclusion

Our results suggest that there is a heretofore unappreciated benefit of legally enforcing relied-upon promises with expectation damages: legal enforcement reduces overinvestment that results when promisees invest in order to psychologically lock-in their promisors. Reliance on promises matters, because many promisors are more likely to keep promises that have been relied upon. And promisees anticipate that reliance has this effect, and accordingly some promisees overinvest in order to prod their promisors into keeping their promises.
References


APPENDIX A

Proof of Proposition 4  Proof. If there was no promise, the equilibrium follows immediately from inserting \( p = 0 \) into the utility function (9) and the proof of Proposition 2. If there was a promise, the Recipient’s payoff is given by \( \pi_R (1, i) \) if \( \gamma \geq \gamma^c (i) \) and \( \pi_R (0, i) \) otherwise. Expressions (6) and (10) imply that \( g (\cdot) \) is increasing in \( i \). Thus, \( \gamma^c (i) \) is decreasing in \( i \). (i) If \( \gamma < \gamma^c (\hat{i}) \), then no investment level in the Recipient’s choice set will induce the Dictator to cooperate, and therefore \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0) \). (ii) But if \( \gamma \geq \gamma^c (\hat{i}) \), then there exists a critical investment level \( i^c \leq \hat{i} \) such that whenever \( i \geq i^c \), a Dictator for whom \( \gamma \geq \gamma^c (i^c) \geq \gamma^c (\hat{i}) \) will cooperate. Thus, \( \gamma \geq \gamma^c (e) \) it follows that \( i^c \leq e \). Then, then since \( \pi_R (1, i) \) is maximized when \( i = e \) and \( \pi_R (1, e) > \pi_R (1, 0) > \pi_R (0, 0) \) by expression (2), the Recipient will always choose \( e \), and the Dictator will cooperate: \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (1, e) \). (iii) If, by contrast, \( \gamma^c (\hat{i}) \leq \gamma < \gamma^c (e) \) then \( i^c \in (e, \hat{i}] \). As \( \max_{i \in [i^c, \hat{i}]} \pi_R (1, i) = \pi_R (1, i^c) \), the Recipient will choose \( \hat{i} = i^c \) and so \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (1, i^c) \) if \( \pi_R (1, i^c) > \pi_R (0, 0) \), and \( (\hat{a}, \hat{i}) = (0, 0) \), otherwise. ■

Simple example exloring the basic tradeoffs that result from introducing uncertainty over Dictator types. No Legal Regime. Suppose that material payoffs are given by our particular specification in (7) and (8), and that the Dictator’s guilt function is linear so that her utility in the event that she made a promise is given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_D(a, 1) = \begin{cases} 
        15 - 3a - \gamma(1 - a)6 & \text{if } i \leq 1 \\
        15 - 3a - \gamma(1 - a) (6.50 + .75i) & \text{if } i > 1 
    \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Suppose that the Dictator can be one of three types: a high guilt type with \( \gamma = \frac{1}{2} > \frac{3}{7.25} \), a low-guilt type with \( \gamma = \frac{1}{4} < \frac{3}{11} \), and an intermediate type with \( \gamma = \frac{3}{8} \). The Recipient is uncertain about the Dictator’s guilt parameter, assigning probabilities \( p_1, p_2, \) and \( p_3 \) to the low-, intermediate-, and high-guilt types respectively where \( p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1 \). It then follows from Proposition (4) that in the absence of a legal regime, the Dictator never cooperates if \( \gamma = \frac{1}{4} \), the Dictator always cooperates regardless of the investment level if \( \gamma = \frac{1}{2} > \frac{3}{7.25} \), and the Dictator cooperates if and only if \( i \geq 2 \) if \( \gamma = \frac{3}{8} \). It can therefore be seen that the likelihood that the Recipient assigns to the Dictator cooperating is \( p_3 \) if he invests less than 2, and \( p_2 + p_3 \) if he invests more than or equal to 2.

Since the behavior of the low-guilt and high-guilt Dictator doesn’t depend on the Recipient’s investment level, we can characterize the equilibrium by the Recipient’s
investment choice, \( \hat{i} \), and the action of the Dictator with the intermediate guilt parameter, \( \hat{a}^m \). Proposition 7 summarizes.

**Proposition 7** Equilibrium, \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) \), in the absence of a legal regime:

If the Dictator made no promise to cooperate, then the Recipient invests zero and the Dictator doesn’t cooperate: \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) = (0, 0) \). If the Dictator made a promise to cooperate, then the Dictator never cooperates if \( \gamma = \frac{1}{4} \), the Dictator always cooperates irrespective of the investment level if \( \gamma = \frac{1}{2} \), and the Dictator cooperates if \( \hat{i} \geq 2 \) if \( \gamma = \frac{3}{8} \) and does not cooperate otherwise.

(i) If the Recipient is not sufficiently confident that the Dictator is the high-guilt type, \( p_3 < 4(p_1 + p_2) \), then he overinvests, \( \hat{i} = 2 \), if he is sufficiently confident that the Dictator is the intermediate type, \( p_1 \leq 3p_2 \), so that \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) = (1, 2) \) and invests zero, \( \hat{i} = 0 \), so that \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) = (0, 0) \) otherwise.

(ii) If the Recipient is sufficiently confident that the Dictator is of the high-guilt type, \( p_3 \geq 4(p_1 + p_2) \), then he overinvests, \( \hat{i} = 2 \), if he is sufficiently confident that the Dictator is the intermediate type, \( p_1 \leq -\frac{1}{3} + \frac{29}{9}p_2 \), so that \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) = (1, 2) \) and invests one, \( \hat{i} = 1 \), so \( (\hat{a}^m, \hat{i}) = (0, 1) \) otherwise.

**Proof.** If the Dictator made no promise it follows immediately from Proposition 4 that the equilibrium is \( (0, 0) \). If the dictator made a promise, the Recipient’s expected utility is given by:

\[
U_R(i) = \begin{cases} 
(p_1 + p_2)(6 - i) + p_3(12 + 0.25i) & i \leq 1 \\
(p_1 + p_2)(6 - i) + p_3(12.50 - 0.25i) & 1 < i < 2 \\
p_1(6 - i) + (p_2 + p_3)(12.50 - 0.25i) & i \geq 2 
\end{cases}
\]

Notice that

\[
U_R(2) - \lim_{i \to 2^-} U_R(i) = 4p_1 + 12(p_2 + p_3) - 4(p_1 + p_2) - 12p_3 = 8p_2,
\]

which is strictly positive so long as \( p_2 > 0 \). Thus, there is a discontinuity in \( U_R(i) \). Notice also that

\[
\frac{\partial U_R(i)}{\partial i} = \begin{cases} 
-(p_1 + p_2) + 0.25p_3 & i \leq 1 \\
-(p_1 + p_2) - 0.25p_3 & 1 < i < 2 \\
-p_1 - 0.25(p_2 + p_3) & i \geq 2 
\end{cases}
\]

Thus, except at \( i = 2 \), the function is everywhere decreasing if \( p_3 < 4(p_1 + p_2) \), and increasing when \( i \leq 1 \) and everywhere decreasing when \( i > 1 \) if \( p_3 \geq 4(p_1 + p_2) \).
(i) First suppose that \( p_3 < 4 (p_1 + p_2) \). The Recipient’s optimal investment is given by: \( \hat{i} = 2 \) if 
\[ U_R(2) \geq U_R(0) \Leftrightarrow p_1 \leq 3p_2 \]
and \( \hat{i} = 0 \) otherwise.

(ii) Now suppose that \( p_3 \geq 4 (p_1 + p_2) \). The Recipient’s optimal investment is given by: 
\[ \hat{i} = 2 \] if 
\[ U_R(2) \geq U_R(1) \Leftrightarrow p_1 \leq 7p_2 - 0.25p_3 \]
and 
\[ \hat{i} = 1 \] otherwise.

Using the fact that \( p_3 = 1 - p_1 - p_2 \), we can write the Recipient’s optimal investment as:
\[ \hat{i} = 2 \] if 
\[ U_R(2) \geq U_R(1) \Leftrightarrow p_1 \leq -\frac{1}{3} + \frac{29}{3} p_2 \]
and \( \hat{i} = 1 \) otherwise. \( \hat{i} = 1 \) otherwise.

When the Recipient is sufficiently confident that the Dictator is an intermediate type, holding constant the likelihood that he is a high-guilt type, then he invests 2 in order to induce the intermediate type to cooperate. But his confidence that the Dictator is a high-guilt type also matters, for when he is confident that he faces a high-guilt type, and there is a sufficiently low chance that he faces an intermediate-guilt type, it is likely that the Dictator will cooperate regardless of his investment level, making it optimal for him to invest one. But if there is instead a high chance he faces a low-guilt type, and a sufficiently low chance that he faces an intermediate-guilt type, then it likely the Dictator won’t cooperate regardless of his investment level, making it optimal for him to invest zero.

**Legal enforcement.** When a legal regime with expectation damages is introduced, Proposition 5 implies that the Recipient will always invest 1, since expectation damages ensure that the Recipient always receives \( \pi_R(1, i) \) so long as he invests at least one no matter what the Dictator does, and the Dictator will always prefer to cooperate: \( (\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (1, 1) \).

In the presence of a legal regime with expectation damages, all three types of Dictator cooperate so long as the Recipient invests one. Thus, the uncertainty about the Dictator’s type makes no difference to the equilibrium when there is a legal regime with Expectation Damages. Proposition 8 follows immediately so is stated without proof.

**Proposition 8** Equilibrium, \( (\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) \), when relied-upon promises are enforced with expectation damages: (i) If the Dictator made no promise to cooperate, then the
Recipient invests zero and the Dictator doesn’t cooperate, \((\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (0, 0)\). (ii) If the Dictator made a promise to cooperate, then the Recipient invests one and the Dictator cooperates, \((\hat{a}_L, \hat{i}_L) = (1, 1)\).
APPENDIX B: FIGURES & TABLES

Figure 6: Design of the Communication Stage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player A Will...</th>
<th>Certainly Choose <em>Send Money</em></th>
<th>Probably Choose <em>Send Money</em></th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Probably Choose <em>Don’t Send Money</em></th>
<th>Certainly Choose <em>Don’t Send Money</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your earnings if the other player chooses to <em>send you money</em></td>
<td>$0.65</td>
<td>$0.60</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$0.35</td>
<td>$0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your earnings if the other player chooses to <em>not to send you money</em></td>
<td>$0.65</td>
<td>$0.60</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$0.35</td>
<td>$0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Player B’s Stated Beliefs About the Likelihood that Player A will Send Money

**APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS**

---

*The first 5 pages are the instructions for the No Regime treatment and second 5 pages are the instructions for the Expectation Damages treatment.*