Case: Seyb v. Members of the Idaho Board of Medicine, et al.

Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 

Citation: No. 24-cv-00244 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2026). 

Holding: The district court held that the right to abortion when necessary to save a pregnant person’s life or prevent serious and long-term impairments to their health is deeply rooted in history and tradition and guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that Idaho’s blanket ban on health-preserving abortions is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest and thus violates the Due Process Clause. The court determined that the ban’s distinction barring pregnant people from receiving life-saving abortion care on the basis that the threat comes from a mental health condition, rather than a physical health condition, violates the Equal Protection Clause.  The court concluded that where the fetus will die shortly after birth or where termination of one fetus increases the chance that others will survive, there is no fundamental right at stake, and Idaho’s policy passes constitutional muster because it is rationally related to legitimate state interests. 

The court thus enjoined enforcement of Idaho’s abortion bans where continued pregnancy poses a risk of serious and lasting harm to the health of the pregnant person or a risk of death from self-harm, but declined to block enforcement of the abortion bans where the embryo or fetus has a life-limiting condition. In response to an emergency motion filed by the Idaho Attorney General, the district court issued an order on August 25, 2026, narrowing its ruling to apply only to the plaintiff in the case. 

Constitutional Claims: (1) Idaho’s ban on abortion when necessary to preserve a pregnant person’s health violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) Prohibiting people at risk of death from self-harm from receiving abortion care while permitting abortions for people at risk of death from other causes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (3) Idaho’s ban on abortion where the fetus is diagnosed with a fatal condition or a multifetal pregnancy reduction would increase the likelihood of survival for the remaining fetuses violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  

Key Reasoning:  

The court reasoned that an asserted fundamental right must be defined precisely to “ensure[] that unenumerated constitutional protections remain concretely tethered to historical understandings,” and focused its analysis on the history and tradition of the “right to abortion when necessary to prevent a serious and lasting impairment to the health of the [pregnant person].” Order at 41-43. As the Court stressed, Dobbs did not resolve whether such a right exists. Id. at 42.   

The court concluded that the record established that this right is “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and tradition. Id. at 43-44. The court found specific historical support from the common law doctrine of therapeutic intent, which recognized a broad exception to a healthcare provider’s potential criminal liability where the provider acted in good faith to treat a patient, and the common law right to “self-preservation,” under which a person “could not be punished for protecting himself or herself from serious physical harm, and physicians received related protection when taking action to preserve the health of patients.” Id. at 44-46.  

The court also observed that most state statutes criminalizing abortion at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification included exceptions for maternal health—with courts interpreting these exceptions “in generous terms that emphasized deference to the judgment of physicians” and treating “life” and “health” synonymously when interpreting regulations providing only a life-of-the-pregnant-person exception. Id. at 46-58. The court noted that during this same period, doctors performed health-preserving abortions without fear of punishment, and medical instructional materials discussed the circumstances under which abortions should be performed for health purposes. Id. at 58-61.  

The court also analyzed protections for health-preserving abortions in the post-ratification period, finding that “state legislatures and state courts have consistently shielded health-preserving abortions from prosecution for the past two centuries—a continuation of the common law’s distinction between criminal and medical abortions.” Id. at 68.  The court reasoned that the “longstanding protections for health-preserving abortions exist within a deeper right to self-protection that is essential to the American tradition of justice.” Id. at 69. The court highlighted that a state could not “constitutionally compel a mother to suffer serious physical harm to save the life of her toddler—to undergo a kidney transplant, for example” —and that “a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior to those of a person who has already been born.” Id. at 72 (quoting In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The court emphasized that pregnancy does not create an exception to this basic principle of bodily integrity, and ultimately held that the right to a health-preserving abortion is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 

Case Status/Subsequent History: All parties appealed the district court’s August 13, 2026 decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Defendants also filed an emergency motion for stay of injunction pending appeal. On September 22, 2026, the Ninth Circuit held oral argument on the emergency motion to determine whether the district court ruling (allowing the plaintiff to offer medically indicated abortion care) will remain in effect while the case proceeds through the appeals process.